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Professional Sports and Antitrust Law: 
The Ground Rules of Immunity, 
Exemption, and Liability 
Phillip J. Closius 
Professional sports began in America in 1876 with the organization of the 
National League of Baseball. From that date until approximately 1972 the 
legal system regarded professional sports as games or amusements rather 
than businesses. Professional leagues were therefore not subject to the same 
degree of legal scrutiny and liability applicable to commercial endeavors. The 
United States Supreme Court, in its resolution of Federal Baseball Club of 
Baltimore, Inc. v. National League, I typified this attitude by deciding that 
baseball was not engaged in interstate commerce, and therefore it was 
entitled to an immunity from the proscriptions of the Sherman Act. 2 Other 
courts applied a similiar attitude in examining contract disputes between 
teams and players. 3 Congress, at the request of the leagues, passed legislation 
immunizing certain league practices from the reach of the antitrust laws.4 In 
the absence of viable player unions to counterbalance their desires, team 
owners in all sports took advantage of their practical immunity from the legal 
obligations of antitrust law to implement practices and structures that served 
their own interests in ways that frequently restrained trade. Public policy 
during this period dictated that the games be kept on "higher ground" than 
the world of commercial and profit considerations.s 
The decline of professional spans' "nonbusiness" status began with 
increased television exposure that transformed professional athletes into 
personalities recognizable outside their respective home cities. Televising 
games was also a clear exploitation of interstate commerce by sports manage-
ment. This high-profile media exposure established professional leagues as a 
national presence and eliminated the league argument that any game was 
merely a local exhibition. Reflecting this change, the federal government, 
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empowered to control interstate commerce and regulate the broadcast media, 
began to replace the states as the appropriate tribunal for resolving legal 
disputes within professional sports. The federal system was more insulated 
than local governments from the political pressures and influence of a 
particular sport. Congress and the federal courts were more likely to perceive 
sports as a business to be regulated rather than a local interest to be 
protected. Finally, the sheer magnitude of the media dollars earned by 
professional sports made its "not-for-profit" image less believable. 
As professional sports leagues increased their wealth and national promi-
nence, the federal judicial system became uncomfortable with its characteri-
zation of sports as something other than a business. The Supreme Court 
reflected this change in policy in the 1950s by refusing to extend baseball's 
antitrust exemption to other sports. 6 The application of the Sherman Act to 
all nonbaseball sports established the foundation for the forceful imposition 
of antitrust constraints on team owners in the sports litigation of the 1970s. 
These "revolutionary" decisions substantially eliminated the status of sports 
as a game or amusement insulated from the legal obligations of profit-making 
industries. Public policy now called for professional sports to be accorded the 
same legal treatment as other commercial endeavors. This alteration of the 
judicial system's perception of the nature of professional sports was em-
ployed by players and their unions to destroy management's unilateral 
control over professional sports and to substitute in its place a collectively 
bargained equilibrium in which owners and players shared control of a 
league's structure. This new balance also allowed the players to participate 
more fully in the increased revenues being furnished by the broadcast 
industry. In this sense, the courts applied the antitrust laws to give players' 
unions leverage at the bargaining table that they had never before possessed. 
The major remaining judicial vestige of the old public policy view of sports is 
the antitrust immunity still enjoyed by baseball pursuant to the Supreme 
Court's ruling in Flood v. Kuhn. 
Team owners in the other sports have tried to mitigate the effects of this 
change in judicial attitude by obtaining some variant of judicial or legislative 
immunity from the full effects of the antitrust laws. This chapter analyzes the 
three major forms of immunity sought by team owners since the advent of the 
modern sports litigation era. These are (1) the nonstatutory labor law 
exemption to shelter restraints contained within collective bargaining agree-
ments, the single-entity defense to render inapplicable to sports leagues 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act, and (3) the direct grant of a congressional 
immunity to foreclose antitrust litigation regarding designated league prac-
tices. The chapter then examines the principles of substantive antitrust 
liability by courts to professional sport practices that are not included within 
an appropriate exemption. 
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EXEMPTIONS AND IMMUNITIES 
The Nonstatutory Labor Law Exemption 
The first exemption to be litigated extensively in the professional sports 
context was the judicially created nonstatutory labor law exemption. This 
immunity from antitrust liability emanates from the policy decision that 
federal labor concerns can, in certain circumstances, outweigh antitrust 
interests when the restraint at issue is the product of collective bargaining. In 
professional sports litigation, the exemption was invoked by leagues and 
team owners when a plaintiff, usually a union or a class of players, challenged 
a restraint embodied or incorporated within an existing collective bargaining 
agreement. 
The concepts and policy considerations at the core of the exemption w,~re 
delineated originally by the Supreme Court in the nonsports context. How-
ever, before the judiciary created the nonstatutory exemption, Congress 
established a balance between federal labor and antitrust interests by granting 
a specific statutory exemption from the antitrust laws to unilateral union 
activity.8 This statutory exemption reflected congressional policy that the 
Sherman Act was not intended to be used against a union for practices that 
primarily influenced the labor market, even if such actions produced ancil-
lary effects in a product market.9 Therefore, union activity cannot be the 
basis of antitrust liability if "a union acts in its own self-interest and does not 
combine with non-labor groups."lO In order to effectuate fully the statutory 
immunity granted to unilateral union activity, the Supreme Court realized 
that at least some bilateral agreements also must be granted an exemption. 
Failure to extend the statutory immunity to at least some management/union 
agreements would produce the incongruous result of protecting a union from 
antitrust liability in its unilateral effort to obtain a certain bargaining goal, 
but subjecting the union to antitrust sanction if management agreed to 
implement labor's demands. The Supreme Court therefore decided to ex-
pand the congressional exemption to unilateral union activity by creating a 
nonstatutory exemption that also would immunize qualifying collective 
bargaining agreements from antitrust liability. 
The Supreme Court established the principles for extending antitrust 
immunity to bilateral, collectively bargained restraints in Allen Bradley Co. v. 
Local Union 13, IBEWll and the companion cases of UMW v. Pennington 12 
and Local Union No. 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co.l3 The 
Court did not grant the collective bargaining process the same absolute 
exemption Congress had granted unilateral union activity. Not every provi-
sion obtained from an employer as a result of good-faith bargaining was 
exempt from the antitrust laws. The nonstatutory exemption was instead 
founded upon weighting the competing policies of antitrust and labor law. 
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Antitrust considerations balanced in the nonstatutory exemption dictate that 
management-labor agreements that restrain a product market will not be 
granted immunity if the agreement can be characterized as either a manage-
ment conspiracy to monopolize commerce or as a restraint of trade furthering 
management's competitive interests in the activities of entities not party to 
the agreement. 14 This liability attached to both management and union, even 
if the product-market restraint produced benefits for the labor force. IS 
However, if a collective agreement did not exhibit such tendencies, the 
restraint could qualify for the nonstatutory exemption. 16 The nonstatutory 
exemption reflects the policy underlying the statutory immunity-the agree-
ment must substantially embody the unilateral interest of labor. If the 
collective agreement primarily embodies the competitive interest of manage-
ment, it does not qualify for the nonstatutory exemption. 
Philadelphia World Hockey Club, Inc. v. Philadelphia Hockey Club, IncY 
and Robertson v. National Basketball Association18 are two of the first cases to 
consider extensively the exemption's application to professional sports. 
Philadelphia Hockey was a lawsuit initiated by teams of the new World 
Hockey Association against the established National Hockey League (NHL). 
The new league claimed that the NHL, primarily through its reserve clause 
and contractual arrangements with minor league teams, restrained and 
monopolized the professional hockey market. Robertson was a class action 
filed on behalf of all professional basketball players, contending that a variety 
of National Basketball Association practices violated the Sherman Act. Both 
of these decisions applied the principles established by the Supreme Court 
and rejected the defendant league's claim for the nonstatutory exemption. 
Although the exemption was created to benefit unions, both courts noted that 
employers can assert the immunity derivatively when they have participated 
in bargaining and are sued for provisions encompassing union activity.19 
However, not all agreements on mandatory subjects of bargaining were 
entitled to the exemption.20 Labor policy only mandated an antitrust exemp-
tion if the provision at issue was a result of union self-interest and the product 
of extensive good-faith bargaining. The record in both cases failed to satisfy 
this standard. However, even good-faith bargaining could not exempt a 
provision that restrained the outside competitors of a defendant league and 
therefore embodied a management-labor conspiracy proscribed by the Su-
preme Court. 21 
Philadelphia Hockey and Robertson established the framework for the 
application of the exemption to professional sports. Two subsequent Court of 
Appeals cases, Mackey v. National Football and McCourt v. Califor-
nia Sports, Inc.,23 delineate the current exemption standards employed by 
courts in this context. Mackey was a lawsuit brought by players against the 
NFL, challenging the validity of the league's free agent compensation 
system, the so-called Rozelle Rule. The players claimed that a system 
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whereby the commissioner had sole discretion to award a club compensation 
for losing a player inhibited player movement and restrained trade. The 
Eighth Circuit reinforced the holdings of Philadelphia Hockey and Robertson 
and rejected the NFL's claim for the nonstatutory exemption. After noting 
that employers, as well as employees, could assert an exemption that attached 
to the collective agreement, the court formulated a three-part test for 
granting immunity: 
First, the labor policy favoring collective bargaining may potentially be given 
pre-eminence over the antitrust laws where the restraint on trade primarily 
affects only the parties to the collective bargaining relationship. Second, federal 
labor policy is implicated sufficiently to prevail only where the agreement 
sought to be exempted concerns a mandatory subject of collective bargaining. 
Finally, the policy favoring collective bargaining is furthered to the degree 
necessary to override the antitrust laws only where the agreement sought to be 
exempted is the product of bona fide arm's-length bargaining.24 
Although the NFL's evidence had satisfied the first two requirements, the 
district court record did not reveal any good-faith bargaining concerning the 
Rozelle Rule. The compensation provision was created by the league and 
then imposed by the NFL on a weak union in the first two bargaining 
agreements. The circuit court used its interpretation of good-faith bargaining 
to fortify the union by giving it increased bargaining leverage through the 
imposition of antitrust liability. If the NFL wanted to insulate its compensa-
tion system from antitrust attack, the league must legitimately engage in 
meaningful bargaining with the union. The Eighth Circuit, however, ex-
panded the exemption by suggesting that evidence of a quid pro quo-union 
agreement to the unmodified rule in exchange for other benefits-might 
satisfy this requirement. Mackey also subtly extended the scope of the 
exemption by concluding that the Rozelle Rule was incorporated sufficiently 
in the bargaining process to qualify for an exemption claim. 2s 
McCourt is the most recent sports case to deal with the exemption issue. 
This case also involved a player's antitrust challenge to the free agent 
compensation system of the National Hockey League.26 The Sixth Circuit 
began its exemption analysis by adopting the three-part test established by 
Eighth Circuit in Mackey. As in the earlier football case, the court quickly 
noted that the first two aspects of the test were satisfied. A compensation plan 
affected only veteran players and clearly involved the terms and conditions of 
their employment. The issue in the case therefore was narrowed to the 
question of good-faith bargaining. After reviewing the bargaining history of 
the league in detail, the Sixth Circuit concluded that good-faith bargaining 
had occurred. The circuit court cited traditional labor law principles in the 
nonexemption context to support its two-part analysis of the bargaining 
obligation. The inclusion of the bylaw in the exact form of management's 
previously imposed rule did not evidence a lack of bargaining, but rather the 
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union's failure, after intense negotiations, to keep "an unwanted provision 
out of the contract."27 Good-faith bargaining does not require either side to 
make a concession or yield on a particular point. Labor law does not mandate 
substantive terms of agreement, and the duty to bargain in good faith permits 
a party to stand firmly on a proposal if its "insistence is genuinely and 
sincerely held."28 Second, the opinion noted that the union had applied 
bargaining pressure to keep the compensation plan out and, when unsuccess-
ful in that effort, obtained considerable benefits from the league as the price 
of inclusion. The incorporated bylaw therefore was entitled to the exemption 
and judgment was entered for the defendants. 
The three-part test enunicated in Mack~ appears to be the appropriate 
standard for application of the exemption in professional sports cases. The 
first part of the test clearly embodies the Supreme Court's concept of an Allen 
Bradley conspiracy and the appropriate primacy of antitrust concepts over 
labor law rules when the restraint significantly affects groups not party to the 
collective bargaining relationship. The second part correctly implies that 
labor law policy is not sufficiently implicated in management-labor agree-
ments on nonmandatory subjects of bargaining to justify overriding antitrust 
concerns. The final part of the Mackey test looks at the source of the restraint 
and its treatment by the parties in their bargaining. Although labor law rules 
should dominate the conduct of a mature management-labor relationship, 
this inquiry is required to recognize the prounion orientation of the exemp-
tion and to give antitrust concerns their proper weight in the balancing 
process. If the questioned provision was initiated by the union in substan-
tially the form finally adopted, employer acquiescence to the union demand 
should be protected by the exemption. If, however, the term at issue was 
initiated by management or if it significantly reflects management interests, 
the exemption will be granted only if there has been adequate union 
participation in the structuring of the final proposal. Adequate union partici-
pation in this sense means that the management proposal has undergone 
some significant modification by the union prior to acceptance or that the 
union has received a specific, significant quid pro quo in exchange for inclusion 
of the term. The judicial inquiry, in the case of non labor-initiated proposals, 
would thereby be focused on the integrity of the union as exclusive employee 
represen ta ti ve. 
The exemption should be granted when labor law considerations indicate 
that an individual employee should not be allowed to "second-guess" the 
wisdom of the union in making concessions or modifications. 29 The integrity 
of the bargaining process also dictates that a union should not be free to 
second-guess itself regarding a provision where bargaining history indicated 
union involvement in shaping or "selling" the provision. In such situations, 
the derived employer immunity can be justified by the need to preserve the 
integrity of the union and the bargaining process, and by management's 
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reliance upon the exclusive nature of the union's collective representation. 
Courts can police application of this aspect of the test by searching for a 
specific quid pro quo for unmodified management proposals. The National 
Basketball Association's salary caps, for example, seemingly would qualify 
for the nonstatutory exemption on both rationales if it were challenged by an 
NBA player. The basketball union shaped the final form of the system and 
received some other benefits, mainly in the job security area, in exchange for 
their agreement. Such an analysis differs slightly from the reasoning in 
McCourt. The Sixth Circuit should eliminate its initial emphasis on the 
traditional labor law interpretation of good-faith bargaining and the unilateral 
insistence of management permitted thereby. Instead, the circuit court 
should focus on the degree of union participation in the structuring of Bylaw 
9-A after the labor group accepted financial benefits specifically offered by 
the league as quid pro quo for the inclusion of the compensation system. If the 
benefits granted by management were related directly to the acceptance of 
Bylaw 9-A, the exemption should apply.3D 
Future application of the nonstatutory exemption could occur in a variety 
of professional sports contexts. New leagues with no collective bargaining 
agreement in force face potential antitrust action regarding their player 
restraint and other league rules. The league needs to embody its practices, 
such as player drafts or territorial drafts, in a collective agreement reflecting 
union participation in order to insulate those practices from antitrust liabil-
ity. In this sense, the exemption, as it did in the earlier sports cases, provides 
the union with additional bargaining leverage in collective negotiations. A 
new league needs a bona fide union and a creditable bargaining agreement in 
order to possess even a minimal claim on the exemption. 
The nature of the labor law exemption leaves all team owners with a 
difficult decision: Should a league contend that a particular practice is a 
management perogative, not collectively bargain over it, and risk antitrust 
liability regarding its implementation, or, should management agree that a 
topic is a mandatory subject of bargaining and obtain an arguable immunity 
at the price of permitting a union to bargain over the practice and refashion 
its form? Many established leagues have tried to resolve this dilemma by 
having the league's constitution and bylaws, management's unilaterally 
adopted practices, incorporated or referenced in the collective bargaining 
agreement with the union. Professional football provides a convenient con-
text for examining problems in this area. The football collective bargaining 
agreement states that any terms of the NFL constitution and bylaws that are 
not inconsistent with the agreement are to remain in full force and effect and 
all parties agree to be bound by such terms. 3l Afackey's inclusion of such an 
incorporated term within the exemption's scope arguably allows a league to 
shelter a unilaterally imposed restraint in this manner. However, this refer-
ence combined with management's assertion that general economic benefits 
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(such as pension payments, minimal salaries) to labor were the quid pro quo 
for its inclusion, should not by itself be sufficient to justify granting the 
exemption. Courts should require a specific quid pro quo for inclusion of a 
practice or direct evidence of union participation in the shaping of the rule. 
A bylaw provision likely to be challenged in the future is the term 
regulating eligibility for the football draft. NFL teams cannot draft or sign a 
player unless (1) all college eligibility of the player has expired, (2) five years 
have passed since the player would have entered college, or (3) the player has 
received a diploma from a recognized university or college. 32 This eligibility 
system is now limited to football. Baseball and hockey traditionally have 
drafted athletes without reference to collegiate competition. 33 Basketball had 
eligibility provisions similar to football. Those restrictions were declared in 
violation of the antitrust laws in a suit brought against the league by a college 
superstar, Spencer HaywoodY Following the Haywood litigation, the NBA 
modified its eligibility requirements to permit the drafting of underclassmen 
through the hardship process. 35 Significantly, the opinion in Haywood did not 
consider the applicability of the exemption. In addition to the question of an 
underclassman being a party to the bargainig relationship, the union has not 
meaningfully participated in the adoption of this rule. Therefore, the suit 
should proceed to the issue of substantive antitrust liability. 
Other provisions in the NFL constitution and bylaws directly affect player 
movement and salaries. If a veteran player performs his contract obligation to 
an NFL team and then signs with a different league, the collective bargaining 
agreement does not deal with the issue of the former team's player rights if 
that player returns to the NFL following the termination of the other league's 
contract. NFL teams have maintained that the former club retains the 
exclusive rights to such a player because, on his departure from the NFL, the 
player was placed on a reserve or retired status list provided for by the 
bylaws. A player in such a position should be able to litigate the antitrust 
validity of the rule restricting his freedom if in fact it has been imposed 
unilaterally by management. 
Additionally, NFL owners split television revenues equally.36 This method 
of revenue sharing arguably allows the owners to control player salaries and 
eliminate the economic incentive for owners to bid on free agents. Players or 
the union should be free to challenge this practice and its price/salary-fixing 
effects if in fact the system has not been the product of active union 
participation. 37 
Another problem in the future application of the exemption is posed by 
potential litigation initiated by nonbargaining unit players (either college 
seniors or players of another league) over the entry-level barriers (such as 
player draft, territorial schools, or veteran allocation) of a particular league. 
An entry barrier likely to be challenged in the near future by basketball 
draftees is the NBA salary cap provision contained in the NBA collective 
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bargaining agreement, which restricts the salary offers that teams over the 
cap can make to their draftees. Assuming that the entry barriers are a 
mandatory subject of bargaining and that unions have participated to some 
extent in forming the entry rules, a question remains as to whether prospec-
tive players are parties to the bargaining relationship. The primary issue in 
such a challenge to entry barriers would therefore be the first requirement of 
the Mackey test: Does the restraint primarily affect only parties to the 
bargaining relationship? Players are not members of the league until they 
have gone through the entry process, signed contracts, and made the team. If 
a nonunit athlete brought suit against a league challenging an entry barrier on 
antitrust grounds, a court would have difficulty characterizing the player as a 
party to even the bargaining "relationship" prior to his signing a contract. 
A district court opinion, Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc.,38 speculated on the 
exemption's application to the professional football draft. The court com-
menced its examination by noting that, considering labor law precedent 
regarding bargaining over hiring halls and seniority benefits, the draft would 
be considered a term or condition of employment and therefore a mandatory 
subject of bargaining. The first two requirements of the Mackey test could be 
satisfied. Regarding the nonunit effect of the draft, the court observed that a 
player draft differs from traditional restraints in that the draft produced a 
detrimental effect, not on the employer's competitors, but on potential 
employees-"persons neither party to the agreement nor members of a union 
which is party to the agreement."39 Protection of such a group is less central 
to the purposes of antitrust laws than the prohibition of product-market 
restraints. Since labor law is deeply concerned with allowing unions freely to 
negotiate bargains they consider best for their members, the district court 
concluded that the draft should be immune from antitrust liability if a union, 
in pursuit of its own interests, agreed to the procedure. 
As noted in Smith, the arguments supporting the inclusion of prospective 
union members as parties to the relationship have been based on an analogy 
to nonsports cases that assert that union hiring halls are a mandatory subject 
for bargaining. 40 Although this comparison seems relevant for the detennina-
tion that the draft is a mandatory subject of bargaining, the argument does 
not apply with equal force to the nonunit effects of the restraint. The use of 
the analogy in both contexts implies that the first two requirements of Mackey 
are actually one-whether the draft is a mandatory subject of bargaining. 
This single-issue analysis has been rejected by the Supreme Court. The 
hiring-hall analogy is a particularly inappropriate vehicle for extending the 
exemption beyond the parties to the bargaining agreement. Hiring halls are 
perceived as enhancing union security and increasing employee salaries. The 
hiring hall is liInited to unique occupations, and an employee is free to reject 
any assignment he obtains from the hall. Since these job assignments tend to 
be short-term, there can be no long-term prejudicial effect of the procedures. 
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Hiring halls therefore have been characterized as mandatory subjects be-
cause, like the exemption, they concern the integrity of the union itself. 41 
Conversely, entry barriers depress player salaries and frequently force the 
individual player to sign a long-term contract with a club not of his choosing. 
A series of decisions meant to enhance union status and employee interests 
should not be used to extend the insulation of an antilabor practice. Requir-
ing the union to bargain over terms of entry should not imply that future 
employees are parties to the bargaining relationship. This is particularly true 
in sports, where the union often is hostile to the interests of draftees because 
of their ability to command large salaries. The union therefore may not truly 
represent the interests of prospective players. 
A final potential problem is that a bargaining agreement might not be in 
force during the period after a current agreement expires and before a new 
one can be negotiated. 42 If management continues to enforce player restric-
tions during such an interval, the issue becomes whether such practices 
should receive immunity from the antitrust laws. The resolution of this 
dilemma should focus on the source of the restraint and the extent of the 
union's participation in shaping it. The clearest case for granting immunity 
would be that in which management simply continued the exact practices 
contained in the now-expired agreement. If the restraints are identical, the 
same principles governing the exemption during the life of the agreement 
should control the impasse period. If the union participated in the creation of 
the rule, protection of the bargaining process and labor law interests dictate 
that the exemption should continue during impasse. 43 If, however, an 
employer significantly modifies a rule and then seeks to impose it during an 
impasse period, courts should be reluctant to grant the exemption. Some 
commentators have argued that, if the employer proposed the modified rule 
to the union and an impasse is produced, unilateral employer change 
consistent with past offers to the union satisfies the employer's duty to 
bargain in good faith and should receive the exemption. The application of 
good-faith bargaining principles to the granting of immunity distorts the 
origin and purposes of the exemption. Employer restraints unilaterally 
imposed should not derive benefit from a labor-oriented exemption. If the 
union has participated in the molding of the modified practice, the exemption 
should be granted. If the union has not participated, the employer's unilat-
eral imposition should run the risk of antitrust liability. 44 
The Single-Entity Exemption 
Most sports litigation to date has focused on alleged violations of Section One 
of the Sherman Act, which renders illegal any contract, combination, or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce. 45 A necessary predicate for the 
application of Section One is therefore that the challenged restraint involve 
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two or more distinct entities, since, by definition, a single entity cannot 
contract, combine, or conspire with itself. 46 In the nonsports context, the 
single-entity issue is litigated most frequently in the parent-subsidiary or 
intraenterprise fact pattern. If the subsidiaries are incorporated separately, 
the First, Third, and Fifth circuits of the Federal Courts of Appeals have 
held that the fact of separate incorporation by itself renders the corporations 
multiple entitiesY The Second Circuit renders the corporations multiple 
entities if the corporations hold themselves out as competitors.48 Finally, the 
Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth circuits have enunciated an "all the facts and 
circumstances" test whereby the court in any particular case must make the 
multiple-entity conclusion on a particular analysis of the corporate entities 
before it. 49 Decisions in this area are rendered difficult because of the 
opposing factors of separate incorporation and common ownership. The 
Supreme Court has recently rejected the multiple-entity theory in the context 
of parents and wholly owned subsidiaries. 50 The Court decided that sepa-
rately incorporated, wholly owned subsidiaries, like unincorporated divi-
sions, were parts of the parent and therefore a single enterprise. A legally 
single entity-a corporation with multiple divisions or a partnership with 
many partners-is incapable of violating Section One, since it is considered 
one entity in the eyes of the law. 
Sports leagues have not presented the single-entity defense in cases 
initiated by plaintiffs who were either players or unions. The leagues have 
conceded that, in such situations, each team within the league is acting on its 
own behalf in competition with each other team in the league in the 
acquisition of playing talent. As such, each team is itself a separate entity, 
and any league agreement embodying a player restraint is an agreement 
between separate multiple entities. 5l In addition, the defendant leagues may 
have not raised the single-entity defense because they preferred to rely 
instead on the application of the nonstatutory labor law exemption. However, 
in cases instituted by nonlabor plaintiffs, the defendant leagues have raised 
the single-entity defense. In such suits, the labor law exemption is not 
available because either the challenged practice is embodied in the league's 
constitution and bylaws rather than in the collective bargaining agreement 
(frequently the case when an individual team owner sues his own league), or 
the challenged practice has a competitive effect outside the bargaining unit 
(frequently the case when one league sues a rival league). 
The National Football League has been the most frequent advocate of the 
single-entity defense. In such a posture, the league has claimed that it is, in 
effect, a partnership that shares revenues and produces a unitary product that 
no individual team could produce by itself. Thus the NFL has argued that it 
should be entitled to a functional immunity from Section One liability, since, 
as a single entity, it cannot contract, conspire, or combine with itself. This 
position also finds support in some of the economic theories that provide a 
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framework for the enunciation of the goals of antitrust enforcement. If the 
goals of the antitrust laws are to maximize consumer wealth and promote 
producer efficiency, the law should encourage a seller to maximize his profits 
by producing as much of his product as he can at the lowest possible price. 
This will keep prices down and provide enough of the product to satisfy the 
entire consumer demand for the good or service. Thus a consumer-wealth 
economist would argue that the antitrust laws should encourage practices that 
increase the output of any given product and proscribe those practices that 
restrict the output. Since the NFL's restraints do not reduce the output of its 
alleged product-the number of football games-the league can argue that 
granting it a single-entity exemption is consistent with an economic goal of 
the antitrust laws. 
The NFL claim for single-entity status has been rejected by the Second 
Circuit in North il.muican Soccer League v. N ationai Football LeagueS? and by 
the Ninth Circuit in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. National 
Football League. 53 North American Soccer League (NASL) involved a suit in 
which the newer soccer league challenged an NFL constitution and bylaws 
provision that prohibited NFL owners from owning a team in another 
professional sport. 54 The district court in NASL agreed with the single-entity 
analysis, but the Second Circuit reversed by noting that the Supreme Court 
has never favored a "joint venture" antitrust exemption. 55 The single-entity 
immunity is rarely, if ever, granted when the separate corporations involved 
in a combination are not commonly owned. 56 The Second Circuit looked to 
prior Supreme Court cases and the decisions of other circuits (including 
player restraint cases) that had applied Section One to sports leagues and 
determined that the case at bar was indistinguishable from that precedent. 
Additionally, the cross-ownership ban not only protected the league from 
other league competition but also shielded individual teams from home-
territory competition by local teams of another league. The Second Circuit 
therefore reasoned that the team nature of the restraint precluded any single-
entity exemption for the league as a wholeY 
The Los Angeles Coliseum Commission, which desired a professional 
football tenant, and Al Davis, owner of the Oakland Raiders, challenged the 
NFL constitution and bylaw provision that prohibited an owner from 
relocating his franchise without the approval of three-fourths of the league's 
owners. 58 The Ninth Circuit began its rejection of the NFL's claim for single-
entity immunity by citing the extensive precedent that has applied Section 
One of the Sherman Act to a sports league, including the Second Circuit's 
opinion in NASL.59 The court also noted that, unlike cases in which single-
entity status was granted, the individual clubs did not have any common 
ownership, nor were the policies of the NFL set by one individual or a parent 
corporation. League decisions were more appropriately characterized as 
action by separate entities acting jointly.60 Although the NFL did produce a 
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unitary product that required some cooperation among other teams, the 
teams were individually owned, made separate decisions on numerous busi-
ness matters, and competed with each other for personnel, fan support, and 
media attention. Although league revenues were divided equally to a signifi-
cant extent, profits and losses were not shared and in fact varied significantly 
from club to club. The NFL therefore was a combination of twenty-eight 
entities subject to the full force of Section One proscription. 61 
Both the Second and Ninth circuits realized that the allowance of the 
single-entity defense would in effect have granted all of professional sports an 
exemption from Section One of the Sherman Act. Both courts were properly 
reluctant to grant such an industrywide immunity in the absence of Supreme 
Court or congressional guidance. The single most influential factor in finding 
a single entity in the nonsports precedent-common ownership---is absent in 
the case of a professional sports league. To that extent, the Supreme Court's 
opinion in Copperweld Corporation v. Independence Tube Corporation,62 which 
is limited to the wholly owned subsidiary context, does not support a league's 
claim for single-entity status. The individual ownership of teams and the 
independent function of clubs in the business decisions noted by both 
opinions should preclude a characterization of a sports league as a single 
entity. The rejection of the NFL's defense also implied that the economic 
goals of consumer wealth and producer efficiency were not the only goals of 
the antitrust laws. 63 The courts did not consider directly the argument that 
the league's restraints did not restrict output. However, the Ninth Circuit 
clearly indicated that although such considerations did not justify an immu-
nity from Section One, they were relevant in determining whether the 
restraints were reasonable pursuant to the rule of reason analysis. 64 In so 
doing, the Ninth Circuit reflected some of the arguments noted by Justice 
Rehnquist in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in NASL. 65 
The rejection of the single-entity defense reflects a policy decision that 
restraints embodied in a league's constitution and bylaws, or that produce 
competitive effects upon another league, are still subject to antitrust scrutiny. 
The continued antitrust exposure of professional sports in this regard is 
consistent with the newer judicial policy of treating sports as a normal profit-
making industry. One bylaw provision that is a candidate for antitrust 
challenge in the future is the NFL's provision dictating that television or 
cable revenue generated by NFL teams be shared equally by all member 
clubs. 66 If a cable channel were willing to offer NFL games on a pay-per-view 
basis, an owner in a cable market with many customers and fans (such as Los 
Angeles) might be reluctant to share those revenues with clubs in smaller 
television markets. Although such a suit might not satisfy the standards for 
substantive liability, the rejection of the single-entity defense implies that 
such an allegation would at least be the subject of a lengthy trial. A league 
facing such a prospect might well consider bargaining with the union 
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regarding the revenue split in order to obtain at least the arguable defense of 
the nonstatutory labor law exemption. 
Congressional Grants of Immunity 
Congress has been willing to entertain the request of professional sports 
leagues for specific statutory exemption of a league practice from the effects 
of the antitrust laws. For example, Congress did grant an exemption for the 
American Football League to merge with the National Football League and 
produce the modern NFL. Such legislation also allows the teams of a sports 
league to combine together and negotiate jointly as a league with the 
members of the broadcast industryY When Congress grants such a specific 
legislation exemption, the judicial function is limited to interpreting the 
statute and defining the intended reach of immunity. No suit or litigation 
would be permitted if the plaintiffs claim or cause of action were determined 
to be included within the ambit of the congressional immunity. 
In light of the judicial rejection of its single-entity defense claims, the NFL 
has supported legislation that would exempt from antitrust liability any 
league rule "authorizing the membership of the league to decide that a 
member club of such league should not be relocated" and (b) any league rule 
relating to "division of league or member club revenues that tend to promote 
comparable economic opportunities for the member clubs of such a league."68 
The bill states that it is not intended to exempt any provision relating to 
player employment within a league. Of course, the nonstatutory labor law 
exemption already provides immunity for most such practices. Having failed 
to attain the single-entity exemption in the judicial system, professional 
sports are attempting to insulate the rules governing the subjects they 
presumably deem most important to their survival-franchise distribution 
and revenue sharing-from the stringent sanctions of antitrust law by 
petitioning Congress for appropriate remedial legislation. The granting of 
such a congressional immunity would appear to be a return to the old policy 
of granting professional sports favored treatment. Consistent with the mod-
ern judicial perception of the sports industry as a commercially oriented 
business, Congress should any proposed legislation that would only 
protect the unilateral economic interests of the leagues. 
Congressional policy in the immunity setting should incorporate protection 
of the interests of sports' consumers-the fans. Players are able to safeguard 
their concerns through individual and collective bargaining. Rival leagues, 
under most congressional action, will retain their ability to use the antitrust 
laws to preserve their ability to compete in the markeplace. Fans and the local 
community, however, are powerless to preserve their "investment" in a 
franchise. The granting of a congressional immunity to particular league 
practices is extraordinary and seemingly inconsistent with congressional 
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distaste for antitrust immunity requests by traditional business organizations. 
Therefore, if Congress seriously considers such a request, the final statute 
should not reflect only the narrow concerns of the team owners. Such 
legislation would be a return to the outmoded policy perspective that 
government should protect management to preserve the "game." A special 
grant of immunity should safeguard the interest of the fans in keeping a team 
they have supported, or in ensuring that the revenue distribution of a 
particular league does not destroy the owner's economic incentive to win. If 
the leagues dislike this interference in the management of their business, they 
should be treated like a traditional business and be denied the antitrust 
immunity. If the leagues ask for a special exemption not normally available to 
an industry, they should expect a certain amount of governmental "interfer-
ence" inappropriate for mainstream commerce. 
SUBSTANTIVE ANTITRUST LIABILITY IN THE 
SPORTS CONTEXT 
A court's refusal to grant an exemption should not imply that any particular 
contract term or market restraint is a violation of the antitrust laws. If a 
plaintiff successfully has rebuffed a league's defense of immunity, he must 
still litigate and win the separate and distinct issue of antitrust liability prior 
to recovery. Many of the professional sports cases to date have alleged a 
violation of Section One of the Sherman Act. 69 This section, as written, 
seems to condemn all agreements in restraint of trade. Since every business 
contract restrains trade to some extent, a literal interpretation of this section 
would stifle the economy. To prevent such economic chaos, the Supreme 
Court, in Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States,7o adopted the policy that 
only unreasonable restraints of trade were proscribed by the statute. Courts 
were required to conduct a lengthy analysis, pursuant to this rule of reason 
logic, to determine if a challenged practice unreasonably restrained trade in 
its particular business context. As antitrust law developed, however, certain 
practices were found to be inherently unreasonable, so an exhaustive inquiry 
on their reasonableness was no longer required. Typical examples of such 
categories of per se liability under Section One of the Sherman Act are price 
fixing, division of markets, tying arrangements, and concerted refusals to 
deal. Most league restraints have been challenged as concerted refusals to 
deal or as group boycotts. 
Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc.72 and Robertson v. National 
Basketball Association,73 two early district court decisions in modern sports 
law litigation, declared that certain league player restraints (such as draft, 
refusal to draft undergraduates, and free agent compensation) were group 
boycotts of individual players and therefore per se violations of Section One of 
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the Sherman Act. However, later decisions by the Federal Circuit Court of 
Appeals have held that the per se standard of liability of Section One is 
·inappropriate for the imposition of antitrust liability in the professional 
sports context,74 The superior courts reasoned that the defendant profes-
sional leagues should not be subject to the harsh per se substantive criteria, 
since some league-imposed restraints were at least implicitly encouraged by 
the judicial attitude of the first half of the 20th century, intimating that sports 
were not subject to the antitrust laws. Additionally, sports leagues are unique 
in that each team has a business need for intraleague cooperation (a variant of 
group boycott) in order to produce an effective on-the-field product. The 
teams of a given league, while competitors on the field, are not economic 
competitors in the traditional business use of the term,75 Finally, the per se 
standard is inappropriate when either the nonstatutory labor law or the 
single-entity exemption and the complex issues inherent therein are present 
in a case,76 A finding of substantive antitrust liability in the professional 
sports context must be predicated on a rule of reason analysis and on a full 
judicial inquiry into the reasonableness of the practice and its effects and the 
history of its origin and implementation mandated thereby. The rule of 
reason requires the court to evaluate the reasonableness of the restraint 
within the context of the industry in which the alleged antitrust violation 
occurs. As explained by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals: 
Under the rule of reason, a restraint must be evaluated to determine whether it 
is significantly anticompetitive in purpose of effect. In making this evaluation, a 
court generally will be required to analyze "the facts peculiar to the business, 
the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed." If, on 
analysis, the restraint is found to have legitimate business purposes whose 
realization serves to promote competition, the "anticoffipetitive evils" of the 
challenged practice must be carefully balanced against its "procompetitive 
virtues" to ascertain whether the former outweigh the latter. A restraint is 
unreasonable if it has the "new effect" of substantially impeding competition. 77 
The Eighth Circuit employs a slightly different formulation of the required 
analysis: "The focus of an inquiry under the Rule of Reason is whether the 
restraint imposed is justified by legitimate business purposes, and is no more 
restrictive than necessary."78 
In the sports context, management frequently has tried to avoid substan-
tive antitrust liability under this standard by claiming that, although players 
were harmed and trade restrained to a certain extent, the challenged re-
straints were reasonable and necessary to maintain competitive balance on 
the field. This argument has been rejected as support for the anticompetitive 
effect of most restraints. Competitive equality among teams-even with 
significant player or income restraints-appears illusory, since the same 
teams have dominated their respective leagues every season. Other business 
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justifications offered by the leagues to support the "reasonableness" of their 
practices have included recapturing of player costs, loyalty to the league, 
protection of capital investment, and regional balance. The restraints, how-
ever, have been declared unreasonable and therefore illegal because (a) some 
of the business rationales advanced have, under judicial scrutiny, been 
declared insubstantial and (b) the anti competitive impact of the restraint 
sweeps more broadly than the proposed rationales for their adoption would 
justify,79 
Most courts have suggested that revised procedures would survive the rule 
of reason inquiry if they were less restrictive on the rights of players and 
owners, if they were more closely related to a substantial business purpose, 
and if they contained procedural safeguards to protect the restrained party's 
interests from arbitrary and capricious decisionmaking. A professional sports 
league therefore could reasonably contain some restraints so that arguable 
parity of talent would exist within the league and those franchises in 
geographically disadvantageous locations would receive assistance in fielding 
teams. However, practices that have the effect of unduly depressing player 
salaries, restricting player or franchise freedom of movement for a significant 
period of time, or vesting unrestricted control over a player or a team to 
league management seem suspect under the rule of reason standard of 
substantive antitrust liability. 
Section Two of the Sherman Act also has been used in the sports litigation 
context. This section sanctions every person who monopolizes, attempts to 
monopolize, or combines or conspires with another to monopolize any part of 
trade or commerce.so The Supreme Court in United States v. Grinnel Corpora-
tion has stated: "The offense of monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has 
two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market 
and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distinguished 
from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, 
business acrument or historic accident."81 The relevant market consists of a 
product market and a geographic market. Products in the same market are 
those whose uses are reasonably interchangeable and whose demand is cross-
elastic. 
Philadelphia World Hockey Club v. Philadelphia Hockey Club 82 and Mid-
South Grizzlies v. National Football League83 are the prime examples of 
Section Two analysis in the professional sports context. Philadelphia Hockey 
determined that the relevant market was major league hockey as is played in 
the NHL. Of course, with that definition of the market, the NHL possessed 
monopoly power. iHid-South Grizzlies also found that the NFL had a 
monopoly in the United States in major league football. Courts in the 
professional sports setting have been willing to accept a narrow market 
definition that usually coincides with the major sport at issue. Indeed, a 
market definition also can be conducted in whether a restraint of 
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trade is unreasonable in a Section One litigation. NASL (a special submarket 
in sports capital)84 and Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum (the unique nature of 
NFL football)8S support the conclusion that a narrow sports-market defini-
tion also is appropriate in that context. However, a narrow market definition 
and the existence of monopoly power does not, by itself, mean that Section 
Two has been violated. Philadelphia Hockey found such a violation by 
concluding that the NHL had willfully and intentionally maintained its 
monopoly status through the use of numerous predatory practices directed 
against the World Hockey Association. 86 However, Mid-SoUlh Grizzles held 
that the NFL had not abused its monopoly power in denying plaintiff an 
NFL franchise. The NFL had done nothing to prevent plaintiff from 
forming a rival team or playing football in Memphis. 87 
Antitrust plaintiffs usually prefer to bring a cause of action pursuant to 
Section One of the Sherman Act rather than Section Two. A Section One suit 
usually avoids the difficult questions of relevant market and abuse of 
monopoly power. However, Section Two frequently is the basis for a lawsuit 
by a new league against an established league in a similar sport. If the older 
organization has taken action beyond its own activities to make 
operations more difficult for the new league, the charge of at least attempted 
monopolization has some facial validity. A Section Two violation does not 
require multiple entities for a finding of substantive violation. However, with 
the apparent rejection of the single-entity defense, Section One will continue 
to be the preferred antitrust cause of action in the professional sports context. 
CONCLUSION 
The non baseball sports leagues have tried to achieve the immune status of 
baseball by obtaining some form of antitrust exemption. The nonstatutory 
labor law exemption seems to be the most effective exemption achieved by 
the leagues in that provisions embodied within a legitimate collective bargain-
ing agreement will not be subject to antitrust attack by members of the 
bargaining relationship. As such, federal labor law rather than antitrust law 
will be the appropriate legal context for resolving management-labor disputes 
in a professional league where the two parties possess roughly equal strength. 
This exemption, however, has two serious drawbacks from the perspective of 
a professional league: (1) the price of the exemption is allowing a union to 
bargain over the practice, thereby forfeiting potential unilateral control over 
what could arguably be considered a management prerogative, and (2) 
practices with extra-unit effects are not within the scope of the exemption. 
The single-entity defense has proved to be less useful to sports manage-
ment, since the Second and Ninth circuits, the only courts to hear the 
defense in a sports context, have both rejected its applicability to professional 
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leagues. Specific statutory immunities are totally effective once written into 
law, but getting a bill through Congress is, at best, a long and unpredictable 
process. The leagues will continue to face antitrust liability, generally under 
the substantive standard of the rule of reason of Section One of the Sherman 
Act. This antitrust exposure will not destroy professional sports in America. 
However, league practices will need to be reformed to comply more closely 
with the business purpose that motivated the restraint and to protect the 
restrained party from arbitrary decisions. 
Antitrust liability will lessen the ability of the established leagues' manage-
ment to maintain unilateral control of the sports industry. Such a result is 
consistent with the public policy determination, made by the judicial system 
in the 1970s, that professional sports should be subject to the same legal 
restraints and liabilities as any other profit-making industry. 
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